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INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
COPYRIGHT
Jessica R. Friedman
INTRODUCTION
'With a computer and modem, it is now possible to browse books,
magazines, and musical compositions online and order selected items
directly from the publishers of those works.16 With electronic mail, 7
a message can be sent to a friend or client halfway around the world
for the price of a local phone call. On an electronic bulletin board, 8
one can upload'9 comments concerning a myriad of issues for other
subscribers to read and discuss in responsive postings. Volumes of
publicly available government information20 and classical Shake-
speare2l can be downloaded' and incorporated into briefs or papers
with just a few keystrokes. These activities are just a few examples of
how new digital technologies facilitate the authorized reproduction
and dissemination of copyrighted works or information in the public
domain by and to more people than ever before33
Inevitably, these technologies lend themselves to unauthorized ex-
ploitation of copyrighted works as well. As recent legal disputes illus-
trate, it is possible, without permission, to upload (and download)
copyrighted images from magazines, 4 copyrighted video games, s or
16. With respect to books and magazines, see Richard Wiggins, The Word Electric,
Internet World, Sept. 1995, at 31, 31-32; Paul Ferguson, On the Cyber Racks, Internet
World, Sept. 1995, at 37, 37-39; Calvin Reid, Web Watch, Publishers Weekly, Sept. 25,
1995, at 13, 13. Music compositions can be heard and downloaded through OnRamp,
an online service created by former MTV disc jockey Adam Curry. Telephone Inter-
view with Joseph DiMona, counsel for Broadcast Music, Inc. (June 19, 1995).
17. Electronic mail is "[t]he transmission, storage, and distribution of text material
in electronic form over communications networks." James A. O'Brien, Management
Information Systems: A Managerial End User Perspective 646 (1990).
18. An electronic bulletin board is an online service that enables users to enter
information for others to read or copy. See idU at 646.
19. To upload is to copy a fie from your computer to another computer. See G.
Burgess Allison, A Lawyer's Guide to the Internet 332 (1995).
20. See e.g., id. at 293-323 (listing "Government Sources of Business and Eco-
nomic Information on the Internet").
21. See Robert Sanchez, The Digital Press, Internet World, Sept. 1995, at 58, 58.
This article describes Project Gutenberg, the goal of which "is to provide a library of
10,000 of the most-used public-domain electronic texts ... by the end of the year
2001." Id.
22. To download is to copy material from another computer to your computer.
Allison, supra note 19, at 332.
23. Digital technology "also ensure[s] that copies will be perfect reproductions,
without the degradation that normally occurs today when audio and videotapes are
copied." 141 Cong. Rec. S14550, S14450 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995) (remarks of Senator
Hatch in introducing the NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995, S. 1284, 104th Cong.
1st Sess. (1995)).
24. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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other proprietary materials,16 or to create your own digital renditions
of other people's graphic,2 7 musical28 or other2 9 works, and to dis-
tribute these items to millions of people, for profit30 or just for fun,31
all under an assumed name.3
25. Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (involving
the uploading and downloading of copyrighted Sega video games). In Sega, the de-
fendants actually were held liable for contributory infringement as opposed to direct
infringement, because they themselves did not actually upload or download any of the
copyrighted software. Id. at 686-87
26. Religious Technology Ctr. v. NETCOM On-line Communication Servs., Inc.,
No. C-95-20091 RMW, 1995 WL 86532, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1995) (involving the
uploading and downloading of copyrighted works of the Church of Scientology).
27. See, e.g., Tad Crawford, Copyright and the Digital Revolution, Comm. Arts,
Jan./Feb. 1993, at 156, 156-58 (describing the ease with which components of photo-
graphs can be combined through digital technology); David Walker & Michele Her-
man, Image Appropriation: On The Rise?, Photo District News, May 1994, at 1, 1, 30-
32 (discussing the recent increase in digital copyright infringement); Multimedia
Docket Sheet, Multimedia Strategist, May 1995, at 7, 8 (reporting settlement of dis-
pute between rock star David Bowie and photographer Donna Ann McAdams which
arose out of Bowie's unauthorized creation of computer-generated print based on
photograph by McAdams).
28. Complaint, Frank Music, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 29, 1993) (alleging unauthorized transmission of copyrighted musical composi-
tions over the CompuServe network).
29. A complaint filed recently by the National Football League charges the de-
fendants with creating and distributing online derivative works of protected broad-
casts of football games. Complaint at 11-13, National Football League v. Stats, Inc.,
95 Civ. 8547 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1995).
30. In Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, there was evidence that the defendants "some-
times charge[d] a direct fee for downloading privileges, or barters for the privilege of
downloading Sega's games." Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
31. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994) (describing
how defendant created bulletin board allowing for unauthorized uploading and
downloading of copyrighted software at no charge).
32. See Complaint, Macromedia, Inc. v. HRHacker, No. C-95-1261 (N.D. Cal.
April 13, 1995) (alleging that 60 subscribers to American Online, who were identified
only by their online names, had engaged in the unauthorized copying and distribution
of Macromedia's software through America Online's e-mail system). The difficulty of
user identification has caused problems for both plaintiffs seeking to hold individual
users liable for certain conduct and for online services attempting to enforce sub-
scriber indemnification agreements. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), a case involving online defama-
tion, the online account from which the allegedly defamatory message had been
posted was found to have been closed long before the posting, making it virtually
impossible to ascertain the identity of the real culprit. See Peter H. Lewis, A New
Twist in an On-Line Libel Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1994, at D10; Peter H. Lewis,
Libel Suit Against Prodigy Tests On-Line Speech Limits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1994, at
D1. Some commercial online services explicitly prohibit postings under assumed
names. The operating policy of the AT&T Interchange Online Network (formerly
owned by Ziff-Davis), for example, requires that members enroll under their own
names and states, "Except where and when specifically permitted by a Network Ser-
vice, [a member] may not upload any messages, data or programs anonymously or
under a false name." AT&T Interchange Online Network Operating Policies, in Busi-
ness and Legal Aspects of the Internet and Online Services 151, 153 (1995).
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Some of these unauthorized activities appear clearly to constitute
actionable copyright infringement.33 But the legal status of other digi-
tal activities under the current copyright statute, the Copyright Act of
1976 ("Copyright Act"), 34 is not so clear. This section of the Report
will discuss the copyright issues which have arisen from the develop-
ment and spread of new technologies. Part I provides a brief sum-
mary of the basic tenets of copyright law, with an emphasis on those
principles whose modification has been suggested. Part II considers
the impact of the new technologies on the rights of copyright owners
as well as the rights of users of copyrighted information. Part H also
discusses the recommendations of the Clinton Administration's Work-
ing Group on Intellectual Property Rights ("Working Group") in its
33. For example, uploading and downloading digitized files clearly results in the
creation of copies. White Paper, supra note 14, at 65-66. Even when you use your
computer "as a 'dumb' terminal to access a file resident on another computer such as
a [bulletin board] or [an] Internet host, a copy of at least the portion viewed is made
in the user's computer. Without such copying .... no screen display would be possi-
ble." Id. at 66; see also id at 65-56 (listing several other examples of electronic trans-
actions that result in the creation of copies). Because there is no dispute that these
activities result in the creation of copies, there does not appear to be any question
that the unauthorized commission of such activities constitutes copyright infringe-
ment. For example, in Sega, the court found that the unauthorized uploading and
downloading of copyrighted video games violated the plaintiffs copyright in the
games. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686; see also LaMacdzia, 871 F. Supp. at 536 (addressing
criminal prosecution based on the unauthorized uploading and downloading of copy-
righted software); Religious Technology Ctr. v. NETCOM On-line Communication
Servs., Inc., No. C-95-20091 RMW, 1995 WL 86532, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1995)
(issuing temporary restraining order prohibiting the uploading and downloading of
confidential copyrighted works).
Digital technology also enables the creation of unauthorized derivative works. It is
easy to take a graphic work, such as a photograph, and rearrange it or "transform" it
into another medium. Indeed, "[i]n many cases, technology acts as a catalyst," in
effect encouraging artists to manipulate the works of other artists just because they
have the capacity to do so. Walker & Herman, supra note 27, at 30. Moreover, the
same technology that enables digital appropriation facilitates the disguising of original
images. See id. at 31. Recently, a photographer filed a claim against rock star David
Bowie which alleged that Bowie had created a computer-generated print of one of her
photographs and used it to illustrate an article on performance art. See supra note 27.
Many artists do not understand that by engaging in the technological appropriation
and manipulation of images, they may be violating the Copyright Act, believing in-
stead that "'[i]f you take something and morph it, it's yours."' Walker & Herman,
supra note 27, at 31 (quoting Jonathan Gibson, owner of graphic design firm Form
and Function). But there is no question from an informed legal standpoint that the
works created by these methods, absent authorization or any other legal justification,
are derivative works.
Finally, it seems clear that when one uploads copyrighted material onto a bulletin
board or other electronic forum, as did subscribers to the defendant's bulletin board
in Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993), the material is
shown "by means of a... device," thereby implicating the display right. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994); see infra note 41 and accompanying text. The same result is reached
when one "browses" material online; "a public display of at least a portion of the
browsed work occurs." White Paper, supra note 14, at 72,
34. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1101 (1994)).
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preliminary draft report ("Green Paper")35 and its final report
("White Paper").16 Part III discusses the difficulties involved in en-
forcing copyright law on the information superhighway, including the
thorny issue of online service provider liability. Finally, part III con-
siders proposed solutions to some of these difficulties.
I. BASIC COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES
Subject to certain statutory limitations, § 106 of the Copyright Act 37
gives a copyright holder the exclusive right to (1) reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords, s (2) prepare derivative
works based on the copyrighted work,3 9 (3) distribute copies of the
copyrighted work to the public, (4) perform the copyrighted work
publicly,40 and (5) display the copyrighted work publicly.41 Anyone
who engages in or authorizes any of these activities without the per-
mission of the copyright holder may be held liable for copyright
infringement.42
35. Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Information Infrastructure
Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (1994)
[hereinafter Green Paper]. The Working Group published the Green Paper following
public hearings and the subsequent submission of written comments. Id. at 2. The
Green Paper also briefly discusses the impact of the information superhighway on
patent, trademark, and trade secret law.
36. White Paper, supra note 14. After the publication of the Green Paper, the
Working Group received voluminous comments from a wide range of interested par-
ties, conducted four days of hearings in different cities, held a special conference on
fair use, and kicked off a "Copyright Awareness Campaign." Id. at 4-5. The Working
Group issued the White Paper in September 1995.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
38. "Copies" are defined as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). "Phonorecords" are defined as
"material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
39. A "derivative work" is defined as "a work based on one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, mo-
tion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or
any other form in which a work can be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id.
40. "To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either
directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible." Id.
41. "To 'display' a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of
a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequen-
tially." Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994). In order to establish a cause of action for copyright
infringement, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of a valid copyright in the work and
(2) copying of the work by the alleged infringer. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan
Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977). A copyright registration certificate
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One of the statutory limitations on a copyright owner's exclusive
rights in his work is fair use, an affirmative defense that allows a de-
fendant to avoid liability for activity which otherwise would constitute
infringement.4 3 Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which codified de-
cades of judicial precedent, requires that in determining whether a
certain use of a copyrighted work is fair, a court must consider four
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of
the work used, and (4) the effect of the use on the market for the
copyrighted work."
The "first sale" doctrine limits the copyright owner's exclusive right
of distribution. This doctrine, which is codified in § 109 of the Copy-
right Act, provides that if a copyright owner transfers ownership of a
lawfully made copy of a work, the transferee "is entitled ... to sell or
otherwise dispose of... that copy."45 Thus, if someone bought a book
at a bookstore, she would not infringe the copyright in the book if she
subsequently sold the book at a garage sale.46
Other limitations on copyright are found in § 108 of the Copyright
Act, which allows library employees to make or distribute one copy of
constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership of a valid copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1994); Joan Fabrics, 558 F.2d at 1092 & n1. It is generally not possible to establish
copying by direct evidence, because it is rare that the plaintiff has a witness who actu-
ally saw the defendant in the act of copying the plaintiff's work. 3 Melville B. Nimmer
& David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01[B], at 13-10 to 13-11 (1994); Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). For this
reason, a plaintiff may show copying by demonstrating that (1) the defendant had
access to the copyrighted work and (2) the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work. i Access means that the defendant saw or heard,
or had the opportunity to see or hear, the plaintiff's work. See Smith v. Little, Brown
& Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966).
Substantially similarity means that the average person would recognize the alleged
infringing work as having been based on or taken from the copyrighted work. Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); Roth, 429 F.2d at 1110.
The Copyright Act provides several remedies for infringement, including (1) an
injunction prohibiting the further violation of the copyright holder's rights, (2) the
impoundment and destruction of all infringing works, (3) actual damages and profits
or statutory damages, and (4) attorney's fees. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-505 (1994); Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433-34 (1984).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
44. Id.; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994). With
respect to the first factor, the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose expressly endorsed the
proposition that a "transformative" use, in which the user "adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the [original work] with new expres-
sion, meaning or message," is more likely to be held fair than verbatim copying. Id. at
1171.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994); see Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales,
Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
46. "It is important to understand, however, that the distribution of an unlawfidly
made (Le., infringing) copy will subject any distributor to liability for infringement."
White Paper, supra note 14, at 67. Thus, if one downloads, without authorization, a
copy of a book and prints the copy out, the sale of that print-out would violate the
copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute his work.
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a work under certain circumstances,47 and § 110, which allows teach-
ers to perform or display works in the course of teaching in non-profit
educational settings' (in addition to being able to assert the fair use,
first sale, and other general exemptions under appropriate
circumstances).4 9
II. COPYRIGHT MEETS DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES
Not surprisingly, many owners of copyrighted materials (commonly
referred to as "content providers") are very concerned about the pos-
sibility that the Copyright Act in its current form may not provide
sufficient legal recourse for infringement that takes place by means of
online technology."0 Much of the debate to date has centered on the
Green Paper"x and more recently the White Paper.52 The recommen-
47. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1994).
49. Other limitations on a copyright holder's rights include the following: (1) the
reproduction of a computer program to use or archive the program, 17 U.S.C. § 117
(1994); (2) certain performances and displays, such as the performance of copyrighted
works in religious services, 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (1994); (3) the "ephemeral recordings"
exemption in section 112, which allows a "'transmitting organization' that has the
right to transmit to the public a performance or display of a work" to make a single
copy or phonorecord of a transmission program under certain conditions. White,
supra note 14, at 98; 17 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); and (4) the compulsory licensing provi-
sions of sections 111 and 119 for cable systems and satellite operators. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 111, 119 (1994).
50. Among the organizations which filed comments on the Green Paper were the
Association of American Publishers, the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"), the Software Industry
Coalition, and Magazine Publishers of America. See Comments Received on Prelimi-
nary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, "In-
tellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure" 2, 4 (n.d.) (on file
with author).
51. After the Working Group published the Green Paper in July 1994, "more than
1,500 pages of written comments on [it] and reply comments were filed... by more
than 150 individuals and organizations-representing more than 425,000 members of
the public-during the comment period." White Paper, supra note 14, at 4.
52. The debate tends to assume that some degree of copyright protection is essen-
tial in the world of digital technology. Even in the debate concerning the liability of
online service providers for subscriber infringement, see infra part III.C, the issue is
what standard of liability should attach, not whether there should be any liability at
all. There are many people, however, who believe that the very nature of digital tech-
nology requires significant changes in, if not the outright abolition of, the copyright
law.
For example, John Perry Barlow, a member of the Grateful Dead and a founder of
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, states that, because electronic communication
makes it "possible to convey ideas from one mind to another without ever making
them physical," application of the Copyright Act to the information superhighway
would allow authors "to own ideas themselves and not merely their expression." John
Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Rethinking Patents and
Copyrights in the Digital Age, Wired, Mar. 1994, at 84, 88. Barlow characterizes ideas
in electronic form as "voltage conditions darting around the Net at the speed of light."
Id. at 86. Moreover, he argues, "if we continue to assume that value is based on
scarcity, as it is with regard to physical objects, we will create laws that are precisely
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dations in those documents will serve as the framework for the discus-
sion in this section of the Report.
A. Rights of Copyright Owners
It seems clear that the existing exclusive rights to reproduce, create
derivative works based on, and publicly display copyrighted works af-
ford in their current form sufficient recourse against digital infringe-
ment.5 3 But there has been considerable debate concerning whether
the right of distribution needs to be modified to ensure that it encom-
passes transmission, and concerning whether digital technology com-
pels the expansion of the public performance right to owners of sound
recordings. There also appears to be a need to modify the criminal
copyright statute so as to provide a broader right against large scale
digital infringement.
contrary to the nature of information, which may, in many cases, increase in value
with distribution." Id at 86. Barlow illustrates his theory in part with the Grateful
Dead's practice of letting people tape its concerts:
[I]nstead of reducing the demand for our product, we are now the largest
concert draw in America, a fact that is at least in part attributable to those
tapes. True, I don't get any royalties on the millions of copies of my songs
which have been extracted from concerts, but... [tihe fact is, no one but the
Grateful Dead can perform a Grateful Dead song, so if you want the experi-
ence and not its thin projection, you have to buy a ticket from us. In other
words, our intellectual property protection derives from our being the only
real-time source of it.
Id. at 126. This model does not necessarily apply to non-aural works; it is hard to
imagine how a book publisher could engage in large-scale free distribution of its
works (in their entireties) and still retain demand for the originals. Perhaps the pub-
lisher might permit tapings of readings, but readings are not as integral a part of the
book publishing business as live performances are a part of the music business.
Another advocate of an unrestricted right to use works in electronic form for the
purpose of creative experimentation is John Oswald, a Canadian composer who cre-
ates musical works from existing electronic materials in a genre referred to as
"plunderphonics." See David Gans, The Man Who Stole Michael Jackson's Face,
Wired, Feb. 1995, at 137, 137. The name "plunderphonics" refers to the taking of
entire musical pieces and transforming them electronically, for example, by playing
them at different speeds or "build[ing] a jazz quartet from four separate and unrelated
solo performances." Id. at 138. The Free Software Foundation, an organization which
urges that there be no proprietary rights in software, is also against the application of
copyright law to the information superhighway. See G. Pascal Zachary, Computer
Data Spur Copyright Proposal, Wall St. J., July 7, 1994, at B5.
These views tend to be abhorrent to authors of copyrighted materials and, there-
fore, tend not to receive much attention or consideration from content providers and
the attorneys who represent them. But in considering the impact of digital technology
on copyright law, it is important to keep in mind that many people who use the In-
ternet have similar beliefs. These beliefs are valuable because they force us to re-
member that the primary constitutional purpose of the copyright and other
intellectual property laws is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cL 8. Arguably, the technological developments which have
created the "information superhighway" and the absence of controls that currently
characterizes its components are consistent with that goal.
53. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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1. The Right to Distribute Copies
Many content providers believe that the unauthorized transmission
of copyrighted material violates the copyright owner's exclusive right
of distribution. To date, two courts have already endorsed this view.
In Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, the court held that the unauthorized
online transmission of copyrighted photographs constituted an in-
fringement of Playboy's exclusive right under § 106(3) of the Copy-
right Act to distribute copies of its copyrighted images. 4 In Sega
Enterprises v. MAPHIA, the court held that Sega was likely to suc-
ceed in proving that the defendants, who operated a bulletin board,
had violated Sega's exclusive right of distribution.5 But many believe
that it is not clear under § 106(3) that the mere transmission of a copy-
righted work violates the distribution right. The reason for this uncer-
tainty is that "the right to distribute copies of a work has traditionally
covered the right to convey a possessory interest in a tangible copy of
the work."'56 But in most cases, when a document is transmitted elec-
tronically,57 the sender does not relinquish possession of his copy. In-
stead, the sender keeps his original copy and a new copy is created in
the receiving computer or computers.5 8 Notwithstanding the holdings
in Playboy and Sega, it is not clear that the transmission of a work
results in the "distribution" of a "copy" in the traditional sense.5 9 Ac-
54. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
55. Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The court
also held that Sega had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that
the defendants had infringed its right of reproduction of its games. Id.
56. White Paper, supra note 14, at 68-69.
57. The same would be true if the document were transmitted by cable or by any
other media that comprises the information superhighway.
58. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 213 (stating that, in the case where one
transmits a copy of a work from one computer to ten other computers, "[w]hen the
transmission is complete, the original copy typically remains in the transmitting com-
puter and a copy resides in the memory of, or in the storage devices associated with,
each of the other computers").
59. Id. at 213. Arguably, it is superfluous to worry about whether every unauthor-
ized transmission results in a distribution, because it clearly results in an unauthor-
ized reproduction of the transmitted work. But this argument ignores the principle
that, as the White Paper states:
Each of the exclusive rights is distinct and separately alienable and different
parties may be responsible for infringements or licensing of different
rights-and different rights may be owned by different people. Because
transmissions of copies may constitute both a reproduction and a distribu-
tion of a work, transmissions of copies should not constitute the exercise of
just one of those rights. Indeed, those licensed only to reproduce a work
should not be entitled to also distribute the work through transmission-
thereby displacing the market for the copyright owner or his distribution
licensee.
Id. at 214-15 (citation omitted). The Working Group turns this point on its head when
it tries to rebut the argument that transmission is not covered by the distribution right
and thus amending the Copyright Act to bring transmission within the distribution
right would be equivalent to creating a new cause of action for copyright owners. See
id. at 216. The White Paper's response to this argument is that "since transmissions of
[Vol. 64
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
cordingly, the Working Group has proposed that the language of
§ 106(3) be expanded to include distribution by "transmission."'
This recommendation raises a number of related definitional issues.
The first of these issues is whether there needs to be any correspond-
ing amendment to the existing definition of "transmit" in § 101 of the
Copyright Act. Section 101 defines the verb "to transmit" in terms of
"performances and displays."'" The Working Group has taken the po-
sition that the transmission or a "performance or display" does not
necessarily constitute the transmission of a reproduction of a work.
In the Working Group's view, as expressed in the Green Paper:
When a copy of a work is transmitted over wires or satellite signals
in digital form so that it may be captured in a user's computer, with-
out being "rendered" or "shown," it has rather clearly not been per-
formed. Thus, for example, a file comprising the digitized version of
a motion picture might be transferred via the Internet without the
public performance right being implicated.63
Accordingly, the Working Group recommends that Congress amend
section 101 to add a separate definition of a "transmission of a
reproduction."'
When the Working Group published the Green Paper, many own-
ers of music copyrights and the organizations that enforce them, such
as ASCAP and BMI, expressed strong opposition to this recommen-
dation because it contradicted the prevailing view in the music indus-
try that a song which is electronically transmitted to an end user is
always "performed" to the public within the meaning of the current
law, and thus results in performance royalties being due to the copy-
right owner, regardless of when the music is played audibly to the
user.65 While the Working Group omitted the above statement from
copies already clearly implicate the reproduction right, it is misleading to suggest that
the proposed amendment of the distribution right would expand the copyright
owner's rights into an arena previously unprotected." Id.
60. ld. at 213; see also id. app. 1, at 2 (setting out Working Group's proposed
amendments to the Copyright Act). The White Paper also proposes that section 602
of the Copyright Act be amended to provide that unauthorized copies can be im-
ported into the United States by transmission: "Although we recognize that the U.S.
Customs Service cannot, for all practical purposes, enforce a prohibition on importa-
tion by transmission, . . . it is important that copyright owners have the other remedies
for infringements of this type available to them." Id. at 221.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("To 'transmit' a performance or display is to communi-
cate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the
place to which they are sent.").
62. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 217.
63. Green Paper, supra note 35, at 43.
64. White Paper, supra note 14, at 217. The proposed amendment would add a
provision stating that "[t]o 'transmit' a reproduction is to distribute it by any device
whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which it
was sent." Id. app. 1, at 2.
65. See, e.g., Comments of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers on the Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
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the White Paper, and effectively reversed its view on the issue of
whether a transmission that was not immediately audible constitutes a
"performance",66 it restated the distinction between different kinds of
transmissions in the White Paper and affirmed the recommendation to
amend the definition of transmit.67
A similar issue arises out of the definition of "publication" found in
section 101 of the Copyright Act. Section 101 defines publication as
"the distribution of copies.., of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.68 While the
Copyright Act protects both published and unpublished works, a
work's publication status affects whether and when certain rights and
obligations attach to the work.69 While a finding that a work has been
Property Rights 7-12 (Sept. 7, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter ASCAP Com-
ments] (including statement that the Working Group's view expressed in the Green
Paper "is 'rather clearly' not true under [the] copyright law"). This premise underlies
BMI's grant of a blanket license to the Internet service provider OnRamp last year,
the first such license issued to an Internet service provider. A blanket license allows
the user to make unlimited use of a licensor's repertoire for a single fee. OnRamp
provides two services. First, it enables a person to listen to broadcast music by means
of his or her computer in "real time," without having first to download the music.
Telephone Interview with Joseph DiMona, counsel to BMI (June 19, 1995). Addition-
ally, OnRamp allows Internet users to listen to snippets of music of musical works and
download the works in their entireties for a fee. Id.
Equally disturbing to many of the organizations that protect music copyrights was
the Green Paper's proposal that when a transmission "may constitute both a commu-
nication of a performance or display and a distribution of a reproduction, such trans-
mission shall be considered a distribution of a reproduction if the primary purpose or
effect of the transmission is to distribute a copy or phonorecord of the work." Green
Paper, supra note 20, at 122. The Green Paper offered no explanation why it should
be necessary to "pigeonhole" a given transmission into one category or the other or
why it was appropriate to "allow the sender and receiver to enjoy several of the copy-
right owners' distinct exclusive rights for the price of one." ASCAP Comments, supra,
at 18-19. The Working Group abandoned this proposal, concluding instead that the
character of a given transmission "should rest upon the specific facts of the case" and
that "the courts - rather than Congress - are in the better position to determine
which, if any, exclusive rights are involved in a particular transmission." White Paper,
supra note 14, at 218.
66. The White Paper states, "If a copy of a motion picture is transmitted to a
computer's memory, for instance, and in the process, the sounds are capable of being
heard and the images viewed as they are received in memory, then the performance
right may well be implicated as well." White Paper, supra note 14, at 214, n.536. But
it also maintains that recognizing a right of distribution by transmission will not di-
minish the public performance right. See id. at 217.
67. Id. at 217-18.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
69. For example, every work published before March 1, 1989 must bear a copy-
right notice. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 401(a), 90 Stat. 2541,
2576 ("[A] notice of copyright shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies .... )
(emphasis added) (amended by Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 2857). The publication of such a work with-
out proper copyright notice may result in its entering the public domain, which would
strip it of all copyright protection. Additionally, in a copyright infringement suit in
which the defendant raises the defense of fair use, an unauthorized use of a published
work is more likely to be considered a fair use than an unauthorized use of an unpub-
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published often operates to the detriment of the copyright owner,
there may be some cases where a copyright owner wishes to publish
her work first, or solely, by distributing it online. The legislative his-
tory of the Copyright Act demonstrates that publication was not in-
tended to include "any form of dissemination in which a material
object does not change hands."71 Because, as noted above,7 this
transfer does not occur when a work is distributed by transmission,
the White Paper recommends that Congress amend the definition of
publication to provide "that a work may be published by distribution
of copies ... to the public by transmission."7 3
Another issue related to the recognition of "transmission" as a form
of distribution reserved to the copyright owner is whether the right to
distribute copies by transmission should be limited by the first sale
doctrine,74 which itself is a limitation on the copyright owner's exclu-
sive distribution right.75 Like the term "distribution," the first sale
doctrine was intended and is drafted to apply "only to those situations
where the owner of a particular copy disposes of physical possession
of that particular copy. 76 Because transmission does not necessarily
have this result, the Green Paper recommended amending § 109 to
provide explicitly that the first sale doctrine does not apply to trans-
missions.77 In the White Paper, the Working Group discarded this
recommendation. But it did so on the ground that "[t]o apply the first
lished work. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539. 564
(1985).
70. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 219-20.
71. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5754.
72. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
73. White Paper, supra note 14, at 219. This proposed amendment could, how-
ever, have the unfortunate result of making certain transmissions into unintended
publications, thereby taking away the traditional right of a copyright owner to decide
when a work shall be published. See Comments by The Association of American Pub-
lishers on the Preliminary Draft of the Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights 7-8 (Sept. 7, 1994) (on file with author). In particular, this result
might occur in a situation where a scientific or technical publisher transmits -to a few
targeted users, specially compiled materials which are not, and will not be, 'published'
in the traditional sense of the term ... for the purpose of commentary or peer re-
view." Id. at 7. Publishers would not want such transmission "ipso facto Jtol consti-
tute 'publication' under the proposed revision of the Act." Id.
74. For a discussion of the first sale doctrine, see supra notes 45-46 and accompa-
nying text.
75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
76. White Paper, supra note 14, at 92.
77. Green Paper, supra note 35, at 124-25. This recommendation also provoked
debate because it indicated that one would be prohibited, for example, from transmit-
ting a well-liked novel to friend even though one is currently permitted by law to pass
along one's actual copy of a novel without being liable for copyright infringement.
The Green Paper's proposal illustrated the tension between trying to ensure maxi-
mum legal protection for copyrighted works in the context of the new technologies,
and going so far as to give more protection to works in this context than is given to
the same works in more traditional media.
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sale doctrine in such a case would vitiate the reproduction right, 78
because the person transmitting the work is creating a new, unauthor-
ized copy in the recipient's computer. In other words, because the
copy that the recipient receives is not a "lawfully made" copy, the first
sale doctrine is irrelevant ab initio, because it applies only to the distri-
bution of lawfully acquired copies. This conclusion can reasonably be
interpreted as an extension of the view that the copyright owner
should have an unlimited right to control the transmission of his or
her works.79
2. Public Performance Right for Owners of Copyrights
in Sound Recordings
A separate issue is whether the public performance right needs to
be adapted to the digital world. Under the current Copyright Act, the
holder of a copyright in a sound recording80 does not enjoy protection
from unauthorized public performances of the recording. 81 The
Working Group notes in the White Paper that "[t]ransmissions of
sound recordings will certainly supplement and may eventually re-
place the current forms of distribution of phonorecords," and that
"many of these transmissions will clearly constitute exercise of the
public performance right," whether or not they violate the distribution
right.83 Believing that under these circumstances it would be unfair to
continue to deprive the owners of sound recordings of a public per-
formance right,84 the Working Group supports "a full public perform-
ance right" in sound recordings.85
3. Criminal Infringement
The apparent inadequacy of the criminal copyright statute is an-
other subject of discussion and legislative initiative. Under the ex-
78. White Paper, supra note 14, at 94 (emphasis added).
79. See infra note 115.
80. "Sound recordings" are defined as "works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
81. Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[A] performance right is explicitly not conferred."). Thus, if a restaurant owner
wants to play a recording of a musical composition in the restaurant, he must obtain a
performance license from the owner of the copyright in the underlying musical work
and pay royalties accordingly, but he does not have to get permission from the record
company that owns the copyright in the sound recording.
82. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 221.
83. Id. at 222.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 223. Such a right would transcend the "very limited performance right"
that two pieces of pending legislation would create. See id.; H.R. 1506, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995); S. 227, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). These pending bills trouble
some members of the music industry who fear that granting such a broad right to the
owners of sound recordings might "derogate the rights of the creators and copyright
owners of the musical compositions which are recorded." See ASCAP Comments,
supra note 65, at 5-6.
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isting Copyright Act, a copyright infringer can be subjected to
criminal sanctions if the infringement was willful and committed for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.' Until
recently, this law was considered adequate to deal with or deter large
scale infringement. But as the dismissal of the complaint in United
States v. LaMacchia~l demonstrates, "the current law is insufficient to
prevent flagrant violations in the [digital] context"81 by people who
undertake or faciliate, with no profit motive, large scale infringement
that causes substantial harm to copyright owners. Accordingly, the
Working Group supports legislation introduced in the 104th Congress
that would make it a criminal offense to infringe a copyright willfully
by making or distributing copies whose retail value is $5000 or more.
4. Alternatives to Distribution to Compensate for
Difficulties in Enforcement
Even as the debate over the optimal forms of enforcement contin-
ues, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that in practice it will
be very difficult to enforce the copyright law against the mass replica-
tion of digitized intellectual property. Therefore, content providers
should be concentrating on ways other than distribution in which they
might continue to profit from the exploitation of their works. Esther
Dyson, a vice chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, proposes,
for example, that content providers "add value" by offering services
which are, or can be perceived as, indispensable to the use of the con-
tent itself, such as "selecting, classifying, rating, interpreting, and cus-
tomizing content for specific customer needs."90
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
87. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass 1994). The indictment in this case charged Mr.
LaMacchia with carrying out a fraudulent scheme involving the illegal copying and
distribution of copyrighted software. ld. at 536. Mr. LaMacchia succeeded in having
the complaint dismissed on the ground that the government's attempt to use the wire
fraud statute as a means of enforcing copyrights contravened the decision in Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), and that to prosecute copyright infringers, the
government must rely on copyright, not criminal, law. Id at 544-45.
88. White Paper, supra note 14, at 127.
89. Id. at 229. The Working Group notes, "By setting a monetary threshold and
requiring willfulness, the bill ensures that merely casual or careless conduct resulting
in distribution of only a few copies will not be subject to criminal prosecution and that
criminal charges will not be brought unless there is a significant level of harm to the
copyright owner's rights." Id.
90. Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, Wired, July 1995, at 136, 183; see also Richard
Seltzer, Personal Touch, Internet World, Nov. 1995, at 89, 90 ("The gravitational pull
of the Internet is toward the center, toward users interacting with one another, and to
the rich resources of free information. To capture the interests of Internet users and
make them brand loyal, publishers will want to build on this environment rather than
simply mimicking their old business models.... For example, an online bookstore or
book publisher could include virtual rooms and events, where customers could talk
about the books they have read, and for-a-fee forums, where they could interact with
authors, editors, reviewers, and other experts and celebrities.").
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B. Rights of Users of Copyrighted Materials
Although it is fair to say that the concerns of the content providers
are the driving force behind the push for change in the Copyright
Act,91 one group of users of copyrighted materials, namely libraries
and educational institutions, has asserted forcefully its concerns about
its right to take advantage of digital technology. As noted above,"
§ 108 of the Copyright Act sets out certain conditions under which is
is not infringement for a library or an archive to make or distribute
one copy of a copyrighted work (including a phonorecord), even
though such conditions typically would not warrant a claim of fair
use.93 Section 108 also sets out guidelines which govern, among other
things, the right of such institutions to "borrow" works from one an-
other.94 But those guidelines were developed when "there were no
readily available systems for the supply of single copies of, or for the
licensing of reproduction of multiple copies of copyrighted works,"9 5
and they applied specifically and exclusively to print copies of works.96
To bring the library and educational use exemptions into line with the
capacities of digital technology, the White Paper proposes that the ex-
91. The introduction to the White Paper states forcefully:
Creators and other owners of intellectual property rights will not be willing
to put their interests at risk if appropriate systems - both in the U.S. and
internationally - are not in place to permit them to set and enforce the
terms and conditions under which their works are made available in the NII
environment.... All the computers, telephones, fax machines, scanners,
cameras, keyboards, televisions, monitors, printers, switches, routers, wires,
cables, networks and satellites in the world will not create a successful NII, if
there is no content. What will drive the NII is the content moving through it.
White Paper, supra note 14, at 10-11. The White Paper does discuss the interests of
users, for example, when it mentions the "[n]ew job opportunities [that] can be cre-
ated in the processing, organizing, packaging and dissemination of the information
and entertainment products flowing through the NII," id. at 10, and when it advocates
"[e]nsuring consumer access to and enjoyment of both copyrighted works and new
technologies." Id. at 11. But it seems somewhat circular to say that the benefits to
users of restrictions on the use of informationin digital media will be balanced or even
outweighed by the very availability of the information.
92. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
93. The types of copies that a library or similar institution might make under sec-
tion 108 include archival copies, copies to replace damaged, lost or stolen copies, arti-
cles and short excerpts for users (as long as the copy becomes the property of the user
and the library has no notice that the copy will be used for any purpose other than
scholarship or private study), copies of out-of-print works (if the library cannot obtain
a copy of such a work from another source at a fair price), limited copies of audiovi-
sual news programs, and limited copies for interlibrary loans. See 17 U.S.C. § 108
(1994).
94. These guidelines are known as the CONTU guidelines. White Paper, supra
note 14, at 88.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 89.
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emptions in § 108 be expressly expanded to permit digital copying by
libraries and archives in some circumstances.97
III. ENFORCEMENT ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHVAY
Apart from the questions that have been raised concerning the ex-
tent and adequacy of the exclusive rights which comprise copyright in
the digital context and the limitations on those rights, content provid-
ers are very concerned about their ability to enforce those rights
against digital infringers. The White Paper considers some specific en-
forcement issues and proposes adding a new chapter to the Copyright
Act entitled "Copyright Protection and Management Systems."98
Other possible solutions are being developed independently.
A. Copyright Management Information
The prerequisite to enforcement on the information superhighway
is the ability to discover incidents of electronic infringement and iden-
tify the person(s) responsible. 99 One step in this direction is the devel-
opment of methods for the authentication and identification of
copyrighted works transmitted over the information superhighway.
One such method is the imprinting of digital signatures on electronic
works which will preserve, and enable later verification of, the works'
"copyright management information." ' Various private entities are
working to develop systems for this purpose.1'01 The United States
Copyright Office is also developing an electronic copyright registra-
97. The Working Group specifically recommends modifying the exemptions to
permit "the preparation of three copies of works in digital form, with no more than
one copy in use at any time (while the others are archived)," and "the making of
digital copies for purposes of preservation." Il at 227. The Wlite Paper also pro-
poses modifying the exemptions "to recognize that the use of a copyright notice on a
published work is no longer mandatory." Id.
Another specific group of users of copyrighted materials whose needs are ad-
dressed by the White Paper is the visually impaired. To enable visually impaired peo-
ple to enjoy the advantages afforded by digital technology, such as "large-text" format
on CD-ROM, see id., and to bring the United States into line with many other coun-
tries, the Working Group has proposed amending the Copyright Act to enact certain
exemptions to liability for the unauthorized manufacture or distribution of "Braille
... or other edititions of previously published literary works" designed for the visually
impaired. Id. at 228.
98. Id. at 230-36; id. app. 2, at 3-7.
99. The difficulty in identifying those responsible for on-line infringement is illus-
trated in Macromedia, Inc. v. HRHacker. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
100. Copyright management information includes the name of, and other informa-
tion identifying, the copyright owner, the terms and conditions for the use of the
work, and identification codes. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 235.
101. The Association of American Publishers has commissioned research into such
a system. See AAP Seeks Copyright Control System, Publishers Weekly, Jan. 9, 1995,
at 18, 18. Additionally, the Copyright Clearance Center ("CCC") and EPR Elec-
tronic Commerce Technologies are joining forces to develop a method to generate an
electronic "envelope" for each electronically transmitted work that will provide infor-
mation about the work and register any copying. Multimedia Developments of Note,
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tion, recordation, and deposit system ("CORDS"). CORDS would,
among other things, enable copyright owners to (1) "prepare their
copyright applications and deposit materials in machine readable for-
mats," (2) "sign their submissions digitally using public key/private
key encryption technology," and (3) "send [digital] applications, de-
posits, and [copyright] documents for recordation to the Copyright
Office [over] the Internet, using Privacy Enhanced Mail."'10 2
The use of copyright identification information will be to no avail,
however, if sophisticated infringers simply alter or destroy this infor-
mation. Recognizing this problem, the Working Group recommends,
as part of its proposal to add a new chapter 12 to the Copyright Act, a
provision that would prohibit and impose criminal penalties for the
fraudulent use, removal, or alteration of copyright management
information.10 3
B. Anti-Copying Systems
One currently available means of protecting against unauthorized
copying is the use of equipment which limits the making of multiple
copies of copyrighted works. °n To encourage the circumvention of
such systems, the White Paper recommends adding a § 512 to the
Copyright Act which would prohibit the importation, manufacture,
and distribution of devices and the provision of services whose "pri-
mary purpose or effect" is to bypass anti-copying systems.' 5
In this context, like in the context of double purpose transmissions,
it is unclear just what criteria would be used to determine the "pri-
mary purpose or effect" of such a device or service. Arguably this test
would more readily impose liability on manufacturers than the test set
out by the Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc.'0 6 Moreover, the proposed test may preclude the
lawful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work from making additional
copies of the work even under circumstances which would not consti-
tute infringement, such as the making of an interim copy of a software
program for the purpose of reverse engineering, which has been held
Multimedia Strategist, June 1995, at 9, 9. The envelope will provide information
about rights and pricing, and will register any "pass-along copying" with the CCC. Id.
102. United States Copyright Office, Copyright Office Electronic Registration,
Recordation & Deposit System 3 (n.d.) (on file with author).
103. White Paper, supra note 14, at 235; id., Appendix 2, at 5-12.
104. See id. at 230-33. An example of such a system is the Serial Copy management
System, which prevents the multiple copying of audiotapes. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1010 (1994). This chapter of the Copyright Act, which is entitled "Digital Audio Re-
cording Devices and Media," was enacted as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992.
Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
105. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 230-34.
106. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The Court held that Sony was not liable for contributory
infringement just because its Betamax videocassette recorders might be used to make
unauthorized copies of movies, because the videocassette recorders were "capable of
substantial non-infringing uses." Id. at 418.
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to be fair use." 7 Also, the proposed test also could preclude someone
from making of a copy of a work which had already entered the public
domain if that work was first distributed with an anti-copying device.
C. Liability of Online Service Providers
Even to the extent that it is technologically possible to detect in-
fringement,10 8 it is necessary to consider who is, or should be, respon-
sible for tracking infringing or potentially infringing activity in the
different contexts created by the information superhighway. In partic-
ular, the question has arisen whether online service providers such as
CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online, or private bulletin board
operators, should be held directly liable as infringers for the infringing
activities of their subscribers, 10 9 as has been charged in two lawsuits
107. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992). For a
discussion of these issues, see American Committee for Interopemble Systems on
"Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure" (Sept. 7, 1994)
(on file with author). The ACIS's comments point out, among other things, that the
proposed provision is really not analogous to the law which prohibits the importation,
manufacture, or distribution of devices which contain a Serial Copy Management Sys-
tem ("SCMS"), because "[in digital audio recording systems that employ a SCMS,
the scheme allows the end-user to make at least one digital-to-digital copy of a copy-
righted digital original and unlimited copies of a digital source if made through the
digital-to-analog converters of the recording device. Thus, the SCMS provides an ad-
equate accommodation to the rights to make fair uses of copyrighted works and to
make copies for other legal purposes," while, by contrast, the proposed section 512
allows a copyright holder to "implement a scheme whereby no copies of the work,
lawful or unlawful, may be made." d at 6. Arguably, a better approach is that of the
14 May 1991 Council Directive of the European Union, which, while prohibiting the
circulation of devices whose sole purpose is to circumvent an anti-copying system, (1)
permits "the making of a back-up copy," (2) allows "the legal holder of a copy of a
program to study the functioning of a program to determine its underlying ideas and
principles," and (3) "provides for the right to decompile a program to make inter-
operable programs." Id. at 8.
108. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
109. Direct copyright infringement is a strict liability offense-neither knowledge
nor intent is required. Intent is relevant to the issue of whether an infringement was
"willful," but this issue arises only in the context of statutory damages. Statutory
damages are damages that the court is permitted to impose, within specific statutory
standards, if the plaintiff cannot prove that it suffered any actual damages or that the
defendant made actual profits, or if the plaintiff wishes to forego proven damages and
profits in the hope of obtaining a higher award from the court. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
(1994). Liability for contributory copyright infringement, on the other hand, requires
that the alleged infringer have had knowledge of the direct infringement, and that he
"induce[d], cause[d] or materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct." Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (citation omitted). In Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, the court held that the
defendants, owners and operators of a commercial bulletin board, were contributorily
liable for the unauthorized uploading and downloading of copyrighted video games
onto and off of the bulletin board. Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679,686-87
(N.D. Cal. 1994). The Sega court stated that, even though the defendants were una-
ware of the uploading and downloading, "their role in the copying, including provi-
sion of facilities, direction, knowledge and encouragement, amount[led] to
contributory copyright infringement." Id. at 687.
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brought by owners of musical compositions and a group of freelance
writers, respectively."' The major online services have urged that
"providers and bulletin board operators should be held to a standard
of liability based on contributory infringement, not one grounded on
the strict standard of liability for direct infringement.""' They argue
that it is virtually impossible for them to monitor the "trillions of bits
of data-representing millions of individual messages" that cross their
systems each day without sacrificing the speed that is the touchstone
of online communication; and that even if they could, the cost of such
tracking activities, which would be substantial, would have to be
passed on to consumers, threatening the prospect of "universal ac-
cess" to the information superhighway."'
The White Paper rejects this argument. It lists several specific rea-
sons why the Working Group believes that there should not be any
changes in the application of a strict liability standard to online service
providers." 3 Claiming that it is "premature to reduce the liability of
any type of service provider in the NII environment,""' 4 the Working
110. See Complaint, Frank Music, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 29, 1993); Amended Complaint, Tasini v. New York Tunes Co., 93 Civ. 8678
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1994). In Frank Music, the plaintiffs charged CompuServe with
both direct and contributory infringement by virtue of its alleged involvement in the
uploading, storage, and downloading of musical compositions in its MIDI forum. See
Complaint, Frank Music, 93 Civ. 8153. This case recently settled, with CompuServe
agreeing to "pay an undisclosed sum" and "promote an electronic licensing mecha-
nism that will permit [its] subscribers to legally download audio recordings." Com-
puServe Music Settlement, Publishers Weekly, Nov. 13, 1995, at 18, 18. In Tasini, the
plaintiffs charged Mead Data Central and various publishers with direct infringement
for the electronic distribution of copyrighted works on Mead Data's systems. See
Amended Complaint, Tasini, 93 Civ. 8678.
111. Comments of Online Service Providers on a Preliminary Draft of the Report
of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 16 (Sept. 7, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Online Service Provider Comments]. The online services also
invoke the Sony case to support their position in that their systems and services are
"capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Uni-
versal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984); see Online Service Provider Comments,
supra, at 17.
112. Online Service Provider Comments, supra note 111, at 12.
113. These reasons include the following: (1) online service providers are not the
only ones who are in a position of being strictly liable without having the ability to
screen the material that they handle. (e.g., neither can-film developers) and who nev-
ertheless have to pay this cost of doing business; (2) online service providers at least
can take action when they are informed that infringement (allegedly) has occurred on
their networks; (3) online service providers are the only ones who are in a position to
know the identity of the subscriber who committed the infringement; (4) online ser-
vice providers are making money from infringement when it occurs; (5) to incorporate
an intent requirement into copyright law would make it much more difficult to prove
infringement and therefore would undermine copyright protection as a whole; and (6)
as between the copyright owner and the service provider, both relatively innocent
parties, the preferable policy is to hold the service provider liable. White Paper, supra
note 14, at 114-24.
114. Id. at 122. The Working Group takes the position that there are so many dif-
ferent players in different circumstances (compare a big commercial online service to
an individual person operating a not-for-profit bulletin board out of his home) that "it
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Group recommends "discussion and negotiation among the service
providers, the content owners and the government" to identify spe-
cific "circumstances... [in] which service providers should have re-
duced liability.""'
D. International Implications
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the implications of
the "national" information insfrastructure. But the development of
digital technology and networks transcends national boundaries. As
the White Paper points out, "under the present level of development,
a user in France can access a database in the United States and have a
copy downloaded to a computer in Sweden."'1 6 How can protection
be ensured for the myriad of works that move through international
channels and through the national information insfrastructures of
countries around the world? What makes the answer to this question
complicated is, among other things, the fact that there is no uniform
international law of copyright.1 7 In common law countries such as
the United States, copyright is a form of economic protection for au-
thors.118 In countries with civil law systems, copyright is considered
an extension of an author's natural rights to personality, imbued vith
moral rights. 1 9 The different perceptions of copyright have created
divergent approaches to protecting copyright in different countries.
The White Paper recommends the international adoption of rules that
would protect the rights of copyright owners. 20
CONCLUSION
Modern technologies offer new opportunities and challenges to
copyright owners who wish to exploit their works on the information
superhighway. The proposed changes to the Copyright Act would
is not feasible to identify a priori those whose circumstances or situations under which
service providers should have reduced liability." let at 123.
115. Id. at 123. What makes this debate more complex and interesting is the fact
that many companies function both as content providers and online service providers.
Rupert Murdoch's News America Publishing Incorporated, for example, is a pub-
lisher and the operator of the Delphi online service. Tme Inc. is both a publisher and
the operator of its own "Pathfinder" online service as well as its own bulletin boards
for Tune subscribers.
116. Id. at 131.
117. There do exist, however, international copyright treaties such as the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, to which the United States is a signatory. See Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.
118. See Eric M. Brooks, Comment, "Tied" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral
Rights After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 Cal. L Rev. 1431, 1443
(1989).
119. See Laura Lee Van Velzen, Note, Injecting a Dose of Duty Into the Doctrine of
Droit Moral, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 629, 631 (1989).
120. See White Paper, supra note 14, at 147-55.
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greatly increase the protection available to content providers against
digital infringement and thereby increase the amount of material that
the copyright owners are willing to make available. But the needs of
users need to be taken into account as well. Moreover, given the prac-
tical difficulties of enforcement, copyright owners should be searching
for ways to exploit their content other than mere distribution.
